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ABSTRACT 
 
In 2000, the African National Congress (ANC) through 
its election manifesto, made promises to provide free 
basic services to all poor South Africans. This was later 
quantified as 6 000 litres of water and 50 kWh of free 
basic electricity (FBE) monthly per household. 
Regarding the issuance of FBE, qualifying residents 
were registered and had to agree to a pre-paid meter 
being installed. It is argued that the quantity of free 
basic electricity provided to poor households is 
inadequate to meet basic needs and improvement of the 
quality of life. Conversely, there has been resistance to 
installation and use of pre-paid electricity meters, 
especially in townships around Johannesburg. Although 
prepayment systems have been proposed as innovative 
solutions to the problem of non-payment and 
affordability in utility services, the use of such 
mechanisms is still controversial. This paper reviews 
and assesses free basic electricity and the use of pre-
paid electricity meters in South Africa. It also 
contributes to the on-going debate on FBE and 
prepayment systems. Recommendations are given on 
creating viable and stable institutions to curb 
uncertainties in the provision of electricity services, and 
methods for identifying changes in aggregate welfare 
resulting in the adoption of pre-paid electricity meters. 
Information from this article can be useful for policy-
making purposes in other developing countries facing 
resistance in marketing, dissemination and installation 
of pre-paid meters. 
Keywords: Free basic electricity, FBE, prepaid 
electricity meters, national energy policies, households, 
South Africa. 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Access to safe, clean, convenient, and cheap energy 
services is important to socio-economic growth and 
development. The notion of electricity as a basic human 
right is becoming more widely accepted and adopted in 
countries across the globe [1]. It is arguable that lack of 
access to appropriate level of energy services is one cause 
of slow social growth and development in South Africa. 
This explains the wide consensus that everybody in South 
Africa should be given access to basic energy services for 
cooking, heating and lighting. The question is how to 
actuate this consensus. Over the years, the South African 
Government worked hard to extend electricity to the 
majority of South Africans. By 1993, only 36% of the 
South African population had access to grid electricity 
[2]. From 1994 onwards, the Government fast-tracked the 
electrification process through the National Electrification 
Programme (NEP) - a government-financed initiative 
targeting the poor and the disadvantaged [3]. However, 
the Government realised that the increase in the 
electrification process would not automatically result in 
meaningful levels of electricity consumption by poor 
households due to diverse socio-economic dynamics [4], 
and consequently devised a social tariff to cater for 
indigent consumers [5].  
 
In 2000, the African National Congress (ANC) through its 
election manifesto, made promises to provide free basic 
services to all poor South Africans. This led to the 
introduction of the free basic electricity (FBE) policy to 
address affordability problems related to electricity [3]. 
According to DME [6], FBE is defined as a limited 
electricity supply, supplied at no charge to the user, 
deemed sufficient to support basic energy services of a 
typical poor household as determined from time to time. 
In 2003 the first qualifying households connected to the 
grid received 50 kWh per month of free basic electricity. 
The 50 kWh allocated was regarded as sufficient 
electrical energy to facilitate access to the electronic 
media, lighting, and limited water heating, basic ironing 
and cooking services [6]. 
 
Although this approach has delivered basic services to 
previously marginalised communities, it is clear that the 
system is unsustainable as service backlogs continue to 
pile up. Recent service related riots, sometimes 
catastrophic with loss of lives, and destruction of public 
and private owned property, have continued to occur. 
Perambulates in Gauteng urban penumbras indicate 
simmering tensions between local authorities and affected 
residents over service delivery issues. 
 
This paper reviews and assesses free basic electricity and 
the use of pre-paid electricity meters in South Africa. It is 
our contention that information on planning and 
implementation of FBE and prepaid electricity meters is 
scattered and this paper aims to bring together key 
information and critical commentary based on a review of 
literature and anecdotes, and our interviews during other 
community based researches. The paper contributes to the 
on-going debate on FBE and prepayment systems and 
draws recommendations on creating viable and stable 
institutions to curb uncertainties in the provision of 
electricity services. 
                                                 
2. FBE POLICY 
 
In 2000, the South African Government announced a 
statement of intent to provide free basic water and free 
basic energy to the indigent. In respect of energy, the 
Department of Minerals and Energy (DME) considered 
liquid fuels and electricity: “Recognizing that the provision 
of free basic services is primarily a social welfare function, 
which is the responsibility of Government, Cabinet 
accepted the proposals of the DME, regarding the process 
to develop a national EBSST1 policy” [7]. The DME 
developed the Free Basic Energy policy as a 
complementary policy to the Integrated National 
Electrification Programme (INEP) to ensure poverty 
alleviation by providing for effective electrical energy 
utilisation [6]. 
 
In January 2001, the following preliminary 
recommendations were made: 
• “Provision of free 50 kWh of grid electricity per 
month to all households with concomitant blocked 
or stepped tariffs for electricity consumption beyond 
50 kWh to mitigate the cost implication of the free 
basic electricity provided. 
• The provision of free non-grid electricity to all non-
grid electrified households (connected through the 
National Electrification Programme) funded from 
the energy component of the Equitable Share2 to 
the maximum of R48-00 per household. Any 
difference between the future actual maintenance 
and operation costs and the subsidy will be borne by 
the consumer. 
• Pilot projects were to be commissioned to determine 
the cost implications of the EBSST and to minimise 
the impact on the Electricity Supply Industry (ESI). 
• Based on the outcomes of the pilot studies, the 
DME presented an EBSST Policy Framework to 
Cabinet for approval in 2002/2003 that culminated 
in the phased implementation of the EBSST policy 
on a national basis” [7]. 
 
Research findings and recommendations of the DME report 
were useful for deriving certain policy recommendations. 
For example, the basic utility of free basic electricity was 
established, together with the associated cost. It was 
suggested that an allocation of 50 kWh per month would be 
adequate for all poor households connected to the national 
electricity grid [1, 3, 7]. This proposed level of basic 
electricity was motivated on the basis of the research 
carried out by the Energy Research Centre, University of 
Cape Town and Eskom, which reported that 56% of 
1 EBSST is an acronym which stands for Electricity Basic 
Service Support Tariff. 
2 Equitable Share refers to the allocation of revenue to 
the national, provincial and local spheres of 
Government as required by the Constitution. 
(http://www.moneywebtax.co.za/moneywebtax/view/
moneywebtax/en/page1019) 
 
households in South Africa connected to the national grid 
consumed about 50 kWh of electricity per month. It was 
also argued that the 50 kWh per month is adequate 
electrical energy for a typical poor household to meet the 
needs for lighting, media access, limited water heating, 
basic ironing and cooking. The utility level of this subsidy 
was suggested to be increased by using energy efficient 
lighting interventions and other energy saving initiatives 
[7]. It was further suggested that consumers who consumed 
more than the allotted 50 kWh per month would imply an 
ability to afford full electricity services and consequently 
could be charged the normal tariff for excess consumption 
above the free basic allowance. 
 
Before the promulgation of FBE policy, some pioneering 
municipalities were already providing free basic electricity 
to indigent households on a voluntary basis. However, the 
subsidy was limited to the customers of distributing 
municipalities and consumers serviced by Eskom were 
initially excluded from this exercise [7]. Starting in July 
2001, funding of this allocation of electricity was 
introduced in a number of municipal areas, with allocations 
varying from 20 kWh to 100 kWh per month. Funding for 
these allocations was made from internal sources of 
municipalities, the Equitable Share (inter governmental 
transfer allocation) and cross-subsidisation from other 
consumer categories. The Equitable Share funds are 
intended to be allocated to paying for services to indigent 
households.  
 
DME commenced with the implementation of non-grid 
electrification in remote rural areas, using Solar Home 
Systems (SHS). The capital for these systems was funded 
through the National Electrification Fund (NEF).  
 
2.1 REGISTRATION FOR FBE 
 
Registration for indigent households was aided by the 
Department of Social Development and applicants had to 
meet the following criteria: 
• Reside in a property whose municipal value does 
not exceed R150 000 (typical of a township house 
or RDP). 
• The gross monthly income of all the members of 
the household does not exceed two state old age 
pensions. 
• The applicant agrees to the limited service and 
stays in the programme for at least six months. 
• The applicant agrees to installation of a prepaid 
meter free of charge. 
• Misinformation by the applicant to the authorities 
would result in all benefits received during the 
service being debited to the applicant and 
appropriate legal action taken. 
   
Of all the above qualifying conditions, the use of prepaid 
electricity has been most contentious as evidenced by 
resistance and uproar in certain communities around 
Johannesburg.  
 
 2.2 ROLL OUT OF FBE 
 
DME recommended a ‘self-target’ approach to the initial 
roll out phase of FBE, which meant a twosome approach. 
First, the poor households would be given an option to 
apply for a current-limited electricity supply and then 
become eligible for the free basic electricity allocation. 
Second, the responsible electricity service provider would 
identify households consuming, on average, less than a pre-
determined amount of electricity per month and then 
automatically apply the free basic electricity allocation to 
these households. It was argued that this approach will 
more accurately target the poor and would be less costly to 
implement and fund [7]. DME also considered the ‘broad 
based’ approach to the implementation of FBE based on an 
agreed allocation of free basic electricity to all legal 
household connections [1]. 
 
The ‘self-target’ approach of implementing the FBE has the 
following limitations. It was hypothesised that the 
electricity service provider would incur higher 
administrative costs including the cost of altering the 
current capacity of service connections, particularly in the 
case of households served by credit (conventional) meters. 
Current-limiting devices would also need to be installed on 
the service connection where these devices do not exist [7]. 
The major disadvantage of the ‘broad-based’ is that it 
results in a lot of leakage of FBE benefit to households that 
were not primarily targeted for the programme. This would 
cost the Government and service providers more money to 
implement the programme than when a specific target 
approach was used. For example, the Government Gazette 
[7] noted: 
“There were 6.8 million domestic customers 
connected to the national grid in 2000. If 50 kWh of 
free basic electricity was proposed for all grid 
connected households, the .estimated cost to the 
Electricity Supply Industry (ESI) to supply a zero 
rated supply of 50 kWh per household per month 
(calculated at an average of 40 cents kWh based on 
6.8 million grid-electrified households), would be 
R1.64 billion per annum, for the year 2001. This 
amount excludes infrastructure, vending systems 
and upgrading costs. These costs should be 
capitalised and be recovered from other non-
targeted customers…” 
 
These costs were expected to increase with the rise in the 
level of electrification through the National Electrification 
Programme, notwithstanding the increase in electricity 
tariffs.   
 
3. CRITIQUE OF FBE 
 
The first challenge with the FBE relates to the amount of 
free basic electricity proposed in the policy. It is argued that 
the amount of FBE is inadequate for meeting basic energy 
needs, or for meaningful development and assistance for 
the poor [8]. Gaunt [5] contends that the role of electricity 
in alleviating poverty is not clear, although a government 
may rationally decide to provide electricity for social 
benefits of poverty alleviation and political gain, meeting 
the costs by reallocating resources.  
There have been strong calls by COSATU and various 
other organisations to increase the FBE from 50 kWh to 
100 kWh or more per month, contending that the 50 kWh is 
insufficient to cover basic cooking and refrigeration [9]. 
The Government argued that this amount was sufficient 
since poor households generally have a low demand for 
electricity and that about 56% of households consumed not 
more than 50 kWh per month [6, 10]. Gaunt [5] has argued 
that the provision of 50 kWh FBE has the potential to 
increase household’s average monthly electricity 
consumption: “…the average consumption of the smallest 
consumers has increased from about 25 kWh to 51 kWh per 
month after the implementation of the BEST, and slightly 
larger consumers have increased from about 71 to 93 kWh 
per month” [5]. Some have argued that FBE does not take 
into account large urban households with multiple energy 
demands [11]. Such criticisms fail to recognise that FBE is 
meant to provide a quantum of free basic energy services 
with costs for extra consumption borne by the householder. 
  
Prasad and Ranninger [12], contends that FBE does indeed 
have significant social benefits as demonstrated by their 
study, which showed that households have more money to 
spend on food, use less of other fuels and have more 
electricity days in a month than before. Furthermore, 
provision of basic energy support tariff could assist with 
reduction of combustion fuels derived indoor air pollution 
(IAP) that is associated with respiratory diseases burden 
[13]. Benefits of IAP reduction include better human and 
environmental health and lower health bill. 
 
Table 1 gives a general overview of the energy used by 
various appliances. The table shows that a small 
refrigerator alone has the capacity to use up all the free 
basic electricity (assumed to be operating for seven hours 
per day), leaving nothing for any of the other services. This 
indicates that the FBE advocated for is insufficient for 
basic living needs. Even the 100 kWh per month given in 
other cities e.g. Tshwane and Johannesburg, would not be 
sufficient to cover basic living needs, as cooking on a 
single hot plate for one hour per day (Table 1) would be 
insufficient to prepare a standard daily meal. Provision of 
FBE has not weaned indigent households out of reliance on 
alternative fuels for heat intensive thermal purposes. Many 
households therefore continue relying on paraffin, coal and 
biomass to meet their daily energy needs. Over time this 
fact has been recognised by government and other 
stakeholders, thus the impetus for the development of 
clean, safe, and energy efficient combustion technologies. 
One of the stated intentions of the FBE policy was to 
ensure that the health impacts and risks of fuel burning 
domestic appliances are no longer a concern in poor 
peoples’ lives [1]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 1. Typical energy consumption and estimated hours of use 
of basic domestic electrical appliances 
Item 
Power 
rating 
(w) 
Daily 
use 
(h) 
Days 
used 
Monthly 
energy 
consumption 
(kWh) 
1x Energy saver 
light 
11  5.0  30  1.7 
1x TV (B&W)  35  6.0  30  7 
1x Iron  1 000  4.0  6  24 
1x Kettle  1 000  0.5  30  15 
1x Hot plate  1 000  1.0  25  25 
1x Regular light  100  5.0  30  15 
1x Refrigerator 
(20 L) 
250  6.5  30  49 
Source (Ruiters, 2009; DME, 2003) 
 
Most of the low-income South African households still 
depend on old appliances that are energy inefficient to meet 
their cooking, refrigeration and heating needs. For 
example, if one buys and use one of today’s energy 
efficient refrigerators, it will use at least 50% less energy 
than a ten-year old model. It is argued that today’s 
refrigerators consume 75% less energy than those produced 
in the 1980s [14].  
 
What could further hinder the provision of FBE to the poor 
is that a large proportion of the poor either do not have any 
electricity infrastructure at all, or if they do, still have great 
difficulties in accessing FBE [8]. Rising tariffs, declining 
standards of infrastructure, power outages, increased debt 
and disconnections continue to affect the effective 
implementation of FBE. 
 
The FBE policy stipulates that indigent households 
applying for free basic electricity will have to be fitted with 
a prepaid meter. This mechanism is regarded as a major 
source of inequality in access to electricity. “Given the 
uncertainty of income in poor households, they are often 
unable to buy vouchers and as a result homes are left 
without electricity. In addition, the unit cost of electricity is 
higher for those using a pre-paid meter as compared to 
metered customers” [1]. A counter argument is that the 
prepaid meter assists the household to manage electricity 
usage and thereby end up consuming less than the post-
paid connections.  
 
Ruiters [8] contends that the administrative techniques and 
engineering technologies employed in the provision of FBE 
are meant to marginalise the poor forcing them to accept 
sub-standard services (e.g. a 10 Amp limited supply, which 
trips when several appliances are used simultaneously) in 
exchange for a small amount of FBE. Indeed, an 
underpowered supply is a nuisance to the households and 
the ensuing power outages force people to resort to use of 
dangerous flame illuminators. Frequent power failures lead 
to damage of electrical appliances, possible fire hazards, 
and the annoyance of dark nights. The provision of such a 
service to the poor has the potential to strengthen the 
government’s bureaucratic power over the poor and 
mentally oppress them, limiting their capacity for resistance 
[15]. 
 
4. FBE IN SELECTED CITIES 
 
FBE allocated to the poor varies from area to area 
depending on the agent administering the project. In cases 
where the municipality acts as the agent, FBE remains 
pegged at the proposed 50 kWh and in Eskom mediated 
areas qualifying households receive up to 100 kWh of free 
basic electricity per month. 
 
Initially the city of Tshwane provided FBE to all domestic 
sectors regardless of financial standing and electricity use. 
An advantage of this implementation was the ease of 
monitoring the programme and related processes, and the 
fact that all indigent households are catered for. The 
disadvantage is that the approach resulted in a lot of 
‘leakage’ of the FBE benefit to groups not identified as 
beneficiaries within Government poverty alleviation 
programmes [9]. In order to provide the service to 
deserving households, the city used a new targeting scheme 
whereby people who were registered by the Department of 
Social Welfare as indigents received 100 kWh of FBE per 
30 day period. The extra 50 kWh of free electricity meant 
improved socio-economic benefits of electricity access. 
 
In Johannesburg, until 2008, all prepaid and ‘lifeline’ 
customers received 50 KWh of FBE regardless of 
electricity usage but there were punitive stepped up tariffs 
for usage above the FBE limit. Any customer using under 
300 KWh per month also received 50 KWh of FBE. As 
from 2008, all ‘lifeline’ and any consumer using less than 
300 kWh per month received 100 kWh of FBE per month. 
To better target the indigent, the municipality used the 
indigent list from the Department of Social Welfare to 
assign 100 kWh of FBE regardless of monthly 
consumption [9]. To cut down on costs, the removal of 
customers using over 300 kWh per month was automated 
thus stemming significant ‘leakage’ of the benefit of FBE 
to non-qualifying customers and at the same time providing 
high levels of the service to qualifying customers [9]. 
  
In the city of Cape Town, 50 kWh of free basic energy is 
supplied to households using less than 400 kWh of 
electricity per month.  
 
5. PREPAID ELECTRICITY METERS 
 
Prepaid meters have been widely adopted by utilities in 
different countries across the globe. The prepayment 
technology was initially developed in South Africa in the 
late 1980s with the objective of supplying energy to a large 
number of low-income and geographically dispersed users 
[16]. Eskom and municipalities responded to the high rate 
of non-payment and the limited development of the 
infrastructure required for the dispatch and reception of 
credit slips by installing pre-paid meters in households.  By 
 2003, Eskom had installed 3.2 million prepaid meters in 
over half of South Africa’s electrified households [17]. The 
target beneficiaries were Black communities, but these 
meters have since been used beyond Black townships [8]. 
 
Prepaid systems allow users to consume energy only when 
they have credit in an ‘electricity account’, as supply is 
discontinued when such credit is exhausted [16]. From the 
consumer’s perspective, prepayment systems may result in 
a better understanding of how much energy is being 
consumed, inducing more control of energy use and budget 
management [17]. From a utilities’ service point of view, 
prepayment reduces risk of consumption without payment 
and improves cash flow [18]. Furthermore, there are no 
account posting costs, no meter readers required, and no 
disconnection and reconnection fees and other 
administrative hurdles [8]. However, the introduction of 
this mechanism has been met with a lot of resistance in 
some segments of the society, especially in the low-income 
urban households.  
 
The installation of prepaid electricity meters results in 
financial difficulties for some consumers as they have to 
pay in advance for electricity from the date of installation. 
In some parts of South Africa, prepayment meters were 
forcefully introduced to most households with the aim of 
eradicating the culture of non-payment [3]. Ruiters [8] 
argues that use of prepaid meters has been made a 
condition for debt renegotiations and receipt of free 
services. Reports from Tembisa have indicated that 
residents pay twice as much for units at their municipality 
than when buying straight from Eskom. For example, when 
one buys a token for R50 they get 44 units from the 
municipality and 85 units for the same amount from 
Eskom. This shows a lack of harmony and joint approach 
in institutions responsible for providing FBE to the 
marginalised. 
 
In Soweto, residents pointed out disadvantages of using 
prepayment meters and these included: the inability to buy 
pre-paid cards, limitation in the use of electrical appliances, 
and that once the units were purchased they were quickly 
used up [19]. In areas where the meters were installed 
without the consent of the consumers, non-payment of 
electricity prevailed. Despite implementation of the so-
called highly effective monitoring system, many 
households are still able to access electricity without paying 
by merely fiddling and tampering with the system. Illegal 
connections or connections bypassing the pre-paid meters 
are widespread, and “businesses” of providing illegal 
connections flourish in many townships. Taylor [20] 
contends that early prepaid meters were prone to vandalism 
with residents using a syringe to put sugar water into them, 
after which the ants would move in to consume the sugar 
short circuiting the meter. This resulted in these households 
getting free electricity. As a result most municipalities 
adopted ‘split meters’ where the only thing in the house is 
the pad and the display, and the actual meter is situated 
outside the house in a box or on a pole. 
 
6. ELECTRICITY PREPAYMENT: CASE OF 
SOWETO AND TEMBISA 
 
 
In Tembisa, in the late 1990s, houses were moved from a 
uniform flat rate system of utility services billing, to a 
sliding scale of rates, and then to metered consumption, 
implemented through a combination of remote metering 
and prepaid systems. This resulted in a sharp increase in the 
cost to households of electricity services, with households 
that were not on prepaid meters being billed for arrears of 
thousands of Rands [21]. In 1997, this triggered violent 
behaviour from the residents who went on a vandalising 
streak of meters, to which the council responded by 
deploying private security systems and the army to protect 
the meters. The council wanted to ensure a constant cash 
flow and ‘protection of revenue’ and the residents were 
using collective knowledge to bypass meters and make 
illegal connections [21]. 
 
Regardless of the activism and protests, the prepayment 
system was implemented, this time with more stringent 
measures on its security. Instead of using overhead cables, 
the municipality substituted these with underground 
cabling. High-Tec™ prepayment meters were installed and 
they constituted a heavy metal cover requiring a hydraulic 
pump to lift, and an alarm linked to the municipality in case 
of forced entry. 
 
In July 2011, there were further developments in the issues 
around prepayments and residents again took to the streets. 
Apparently they were protesting that their prepaid meters 
charge even when people have run out of electricity. This 
meant that some residents end up owing the municipality 
hundreds of Rands, yet they are on a prepaid electricity 
system. Again, residents complained that since the 
municipality was acting as the ‘middleman’ in selling 
prepayment tokens, it was costing the residents much more 
than buying directly from Eskom. Residents also 
complained that after recharging the account, the 
municipality sometimes take days to restore power. Zweli 
Dlamini, the municipality spokesman, said the council was 
in the process of upgrading the system and that ‘all this’ 
would be rectified immediately.  
 
Another ‘hot-spot’ where the culture of non-payment is 
prevalent is Soweto. On 5 July, 2011 residents of Chiawelo 
in Soweto protested over Eskom's installation of pre-paid 
electricity meters in their area. The protests became so 
violent that protestors set fire to the ward councillor's house 
and car. Four years previously, Chiawelo residents 
allegedly agreed to become part of a pilot scheme to 
implement split meters that are tamper-proof. This has seen 
more than 90% of residents pay for their electricity, 
compared to their neighbours in other parts of Soweto, 
which have a poor payment record. Reports from local 
newspapers have indicated that since the installation of the 
prepaid meters, electricity tariffs suddenly increased. Since 
then, there has been a constant battle between the residents 
and Eskom. As a result of the tension over 100 of the 4 000 
installed meters were vandalised, with Eskom technicians 
 repeatedly being chased out of the area. On the other hand, 
protesters blamed local councillors for allowing Eskom to 
install the green boxes without their consent. 
 
7 POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
 
7.1 COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF 
PREPAYMENT SYSTEMS 
 
There is need to examine the adoption of prepaid electricity 
using cost benefit analysis techniques. This method 
consists of comparing the performance of the electricity 
distribution system based on the ‘factual scenario’ and the 
‘counterfactual scenario’. The factual scenario refers to 
after the adoption of the prepaid meters and the 
counterfactual to situations where the meters are not 
adopted. The welfare gains or losses are evaluated from the 
difference between the level of welfare in the ‘factual’ and 
‘counterfactual’ scenarios [16]. This is based on the 
premise that “adoption of prepayment meters should be 
encouraged if benefits exceed those of the best available 
alternative, which is represented by the counterfactual, but 
not adopted in the opposite case” [16]. 
 
The model requires discerning the difference between the 
social value of the system under the prepayment system 
and its social value if that innovation had not been adopted. 
The model should be complemented with those 
corresponding to the model’s sensitivity to changes in some 
distinguishing parameters and features of policy 
implementation e.g. tariff discounts. 
 
7.2 SMART GRID AND INTELLIGENT 
SYSTEMS 
 
There has been considerable interest worldwide in the 
concept of a ‘smart grid’ – a more efficient and reliable 
infrastructure for the transmission and distribution of 
electricity [22]. This system has the potential to 
intelligently match generation with demand and help shave 
demand peaks. Smart meters are often part of a smart grid 
and provide real-time electricity consumption 
measurements and outage notifications, as opposed to 
traditional meters that measure cumulative energy use and 
are typically read once a month. An obvious advantage of a 
smart grid is the openness and reliability that is available to 
consumers and suppliers.  These systems have the potential 
to intelligently match generation with demand and help 
consumers to conserve energy and adapt usage to supply 
conditions [22]. 
 
The major highlight of smart meters to energy companies is 
the ability to switch non-paying customers to a pre-pay 
tariff. This can be done using remote switches to re-
programme the meter, instead of replacing it. However, 
there can be a conflict of interest between energy 
companies (which want to sell more energy) and the 
Government (which wants to meet supply security and 
carbon emission reduction targets). Users of this system 
have the option to generate electricity from alternative 
means and feed back to the grid any excess electricity. For 
example in Germany, they have adopted a ‘feed-in tariff’ 
which guarantees a (subsidised) price for the output of  
micro-generation plant and has greatly boosted investment 
in renewable energy [22]. It has been argued that the 
number of feed-in customers is likely to be so low that 
advocating for mass-market meters would be un-economic. 
 
7.3 SOUND INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE 
 
The lack of local government capacity is an obstacle to the 
successful implementation of the FBE project. In some 
cases there is no structure to roll out FBE and in some 
municipalities there seems to be confusion as to whether 
free basic services (FBS) reside in the Chief Financial 
Officer’s (CFO) office or in the relevant technical 
department (e.g. City Power) [1]. A strategically set up and 
conducive institutional framework has in most cases 
proved to be one of the prerequisites for successful 
technology dissemination. Central planning and reliance on 
numerous layers of bureaucracy have the potential to 
hinder effective implementation of FBE programmes 
across provinces. 
 
7.4 KNOWLEDGE DISSEMINATION 
 
DME proposed a ‘self-target’ approach for the roll-out of 
FBE where qualifying households approach the service 
provider indicating the desire to be considered for free 
basic electricity. According to Adam [1], most people 
interviewed implied that approaching the service provider 
meant the current would be cut down and pre-paid meters 
installed resulting in high electricity costs. This shows lack 
of understanding by the communities, both in terms of the 
technology and benefits of adopting such mechanisms. It is 
clear that service providers do not provide sufficient 
information and education about the technologies being 
used. The public should be educated on available options; 
the need to adopt the approved technologies; mechanisms 
for acquisition of the technologies (funding etc.); 
cooperatives and small-to-medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs) for enterprise and socio-economic growth.  
 
Ultimately, this approach could provide the impetus needed 
for a vibrant energy market, where goods and services flow 
through the distribution chain. However, the introduction of 
the Independent System and Market Operator (ISMO) bill 
has been applauded by some sectors of business and the 
society as a much needed institutional support in the 
provision of electricity. The mandate of ISMO will include: 
“…the planning of supply of electricity by generators 
through the national transmission system, electricity 
dispatch and aggregation in respect of sale of electricity by 
generators, act as the buyer of electricity from generators 
for the Republic of South Africa and sell electricity to 
ISMO Customers, in a manner that will minimize the 
overall costs of electricity to customers and to provide for 
matters incidental thereto.” [23]. 
 
7.5 FBE PROPOSED PER MONTH 
 
 It has been argued and shown in field and desktop 
researches that 50 kWh of free basic electricity is not 
sufficient to improve the social welfare of the poor [5]. A 
recent study shows that a minimum of 200 kWh per month 
of free basic electricity would result in a change of 
aggregate welfare for the beneficiaries of FBE [1]. Earthlife 
Africa Johannesburg has also proposed a model that 
includes cross-subsidisation, levies, and taxes to meet the 
financial obligations of the proposed 200 kWh of free basic 
electricity (see [1]).  
 
In situations where sufficient FBE cannot be rolled-out, 
alternative energy sources and efficient alternative energy 
systems should be disseminated as stated in the Free Basic 
Alternative Energy (FBAE) programme. A roll-out of safe 
alternative energy technologies may reduce the tendency 
towards illegal electricity connections and help mitigate 
local electricity demand. Beneficiaries on the FBE 
programme should be encouraged to use electricity for 
lighting and electronics and alternative sources of energy 
for cooking and heating. 
 
8. CONCLUSION 
 
Despite an increase in the amount of FBE provided to the 
poor and indigent households in some major cities, the FBE 
is still pegged at a level too low to make a major impact on 
people’s quality of life. FBE is provided on a household 
basis but does not pay regards to larger households, making 
it difficult for these households to manage and economise 
with 50 – 100 kWh of free electricity.  A minimum of 
200 kWh of free electricity has been proposed to be 
sufficient to meet basic energy needs of the poor and such 
an amount would go a long way in improving social 
development of the poor. The 50kWh allocation was based 
on research data collected almost ten years ago when FBE 
was initiated. It is possible that standards of living have 
since risen and the average South African household now 
requires more energy. 
 
There is a high level of inconsistency in terms of roll-out of 
the project across the country. This is because Eskom and 
municipalities responsible for implementation in different 
areas do not follow the same principles, guidelines and 
standards, and pricing. Cities like Tshwane and 
Johannesburg are giving out up to 100 kWh of free 
electricity per month and some small towns and cities 
registered with the municipality are sticking to the 
proposed 50 kWh per month. The supply inconsistencies 
might be solved with the promulgation of a bill that 
provides for establishment of an Independent System 
Market Operator (ISMO), whose major function is to cater 
for electricity distribution throughout the country. The bill 
envisages that ISMO will lead to a minimisation of 
electricity prices charged to a consumer. 
 
It is clear from this assessment that FBE distorts the energy 
market and creates a culture of dependency whereby poor 
consumers expect the Government to meet all their energy 
demands. In addition, FBE gives a false expectation that 
grid electricity is enough to provide all household energy 
services, while it is possible to meet some of them more 
cost-effectively with efficient utilisation of common 
paraffin, and with LPG in more well-off households. On 
the other hand, FBE does not represent the best way to 
ensure equity, innovativeness, sustainability, and 
technology penetration. The current system of FBE 
delivery has created a culture of entitlement and lack of 
enterprising spirit. (In addition, the FBE implementation 
makes no provision for providing energy services for 
indigent households not connected to the grid). 
 
Prepayment and use of pre-paid meters has been deployed 
in previously electrified households as a means of ‘revenue 
protection’, ensuring that the electricity supplied was paid 
for. This mechanism has been received with widespread 
resistance, with some communities complaining that the 
prepayment meters kept on charging even when there was 
no credit left, resulting in some households accumulating 
spurious debt of hundreds of Rand to the municipality. 
Others complained that they had to stand in long queues 
and that much time and money was spent in vending 
transactions. This has prompted some residents to 
demonstrate and vandalise public entities and property 
belonging to some councillors resident in ‘hot spots’. 
 
On the other hand, prepayment systems have aided in 
revenue collection systems especially in problematic or 
‘hot spot’ areas (e.g. Soweto and Tembisa) where the use 
and payment of electricity is overly politicised. However, 
the implied right to electricity obliges the state to ensure 
equitable energy services to all citizens. This means that 
everyone should receive an equal and an equitable standard 
of service regardless of their socio-economic standing. 
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